Игорь Олемской — практические заметки по системному администрированию Linux CentOS

Kristóf Kovács has a fantastic post about some lesser-known Linux tools that can really come in handy in different situations.

If you haven't tried dstat (I hadn't until I saw Kristóf's post), this is a great one to try. You can keep a running tally on various server metrics including load average, network transfer, and disk operations.

Here is some sample output:

----total-cpu-usage---- ---paging-- ---load-avg--- ------memory-usage----- -net/total- ---procs--- --io/total- ---system-- ----tcp-sockets----
usr sys idl wai hiq siq|  in   out | 1m   5m  15m | used  buff  cach  free| recv  send|run blk new| read  writ| int   csw |lis act syn tim clo
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1314B  180B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  70    80 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1779B 1004B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  84    78 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 904B  362B|1.0   0 1.0|   0     0 |  75    86 | 13   9   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  386M|2203B 1559B|  0   0   0|   0     0 | 180   127 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  386M| 260B  130B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  53    66 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|  52B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  54    77 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|2271B  872B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  94    79 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|  52B  130B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  54    74 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1126B 1254B|  0   0   0|   0  24.0 |  80    87 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.07 0.25 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1030B  130B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  88    82 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 578B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  53    64 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1597B  890B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  85    79 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 552B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  63    77 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1624B 1254B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  81    75 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 478B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  67    73 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 418B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  59    74 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1265B  874B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  82    73 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 758B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  60    80 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1236B 1255B|  0   0   0|   0  4.00 |  93    79 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.06 0.24 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|  52B  130B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  71    70 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.05 0.23 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 214B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  55    73 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.05 0.23 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1201B  890B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  80    80 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.05 0.23 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 108B  114B|  0   0   0|   0     0 |  53    66 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.05 0.23 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M|1344B 1254B|  0   0   0|   0  10.0 | 119    85 | 13   7   0   0   5
  0   0 100   0   0   0|   0     0 |0.05 0.23 0.25| 866M  249M  537M  387M| 172B  130B|  0   0   0|   0  8.00 |  80    82 | 13   7   0   0   5

Learn more about dstat on Dag Wieërs' site.

Lesser-known but extremely handy Linux tools is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

One of the handiest tools in the OpenSSL toolbox is s_client. You can quickly view lots of details about the SSL certificates installed on a particular server and diagnose problems. For example, use this command to look at Google's SSL certificates:

openssl s_client -connect encrypted.google.com:443

You'll see the chain of certificates back to the original certificate authority where Google bought its certificate at the top, a copy of their SSL certificate in plain text in the middle, and a bunch of session-related information at the bottom.

This works really well when a site has one SSL certificate installed per IP address (this used to be a hard requirement). With Server Name Indication (SNI), a web server can have multiple SSL certificates installed on the same IP address. SNI-capable browsers will specify the hostname of the server they're trying to reach during the initial handshake process. This allows the web server to determine the correct SSL certificate to use for the connection.

If you try to connect to rackerhacker.com with s_client, you'll find that you receive the default SSL certificate installed on my server and not the one for this site:

$ openssl s_client -connect rackerhacker.com:443
Certificate chain
 0 s:/C=US/ST=Texas/L=San Antonio/O=MHTX Enterprises/CN=*.mhtx.net
   i:/C=US/O=SecureTrust Corporation/CN=SecureTrust CA
 1 s:/C=US/O=SecureTrust Corporation/CN=SecureTrust CA
   i:/C=US/O=Entrust.net/OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.)/OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited/CN=Entrust.net Secure Server Certification Authority

Add on the -servername argument and s_client will do the additional SNI negotiation step for you:

$ openssl s_client -connect rackerhacker.com:443 -servername rackerhacker.com
Certificate chain
 0 s:/OU=Domain Control Validated/OU=PositiveSSL/CN=rackerhacker.com
   i:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Comodo CA Limited/CN=PositiveSSL CA
 1 s:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Comodo CA Limited/CN=PositiveSSL CA
   i:/C=US/ST=UT/L=Salt Lake City/O=The USERTRUST Network/OU=http://www.usertrust.com/CN=UTN-USERFirst-Hardware
 2 s:/C=US/ST=UT/L=Salt Lake City/O=The USERTRUST Network/OU=http://www.usertrust.com/CN=UTN-USERFirst-Hardware
   i:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
 3 s:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
   i:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root

You may be asking yourself this question:

Why doesn't the web server just use the Host: header that my browser sends already to figure out which SSL certificate to use?

Keep in mind that the SSL negotiation must occur prior to sending the HTTP request through to the remote server. That means that the browser and the server have to do the certificate exchange earlier in the process and the browser wouldn't get the opportunity to specify which site it's trying to reach. SNI fixes that by allowing a Host: header type of exchange during the SSL negotiation process.

Using OpenSSL's s_client command with web servers using Server Name Indication (SNI) is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

As promised in my earlier post entitled Kerberos for haters, I've assembled the simplest possible guide to get Kerberos up an running on two CentOS 5 servers.

Also, I don't really hate Kerberos. It's a bit of an inside joke with my coworkers who are studying for some of the RHCA exams at Rackspace. The additional security provided by Kerberos is quite good but the setup involves a lot of small steps. If you miss one of the steps or if you get something done out of order, you may have to scrap the whole setup and start over unless you can make sense of the errors in the log files. A lot of my dislikes for Kerberos comes from the number of steps required in the setup process and the difficulty in tracking down issues when they crop up.

To complete this guide, you'll need the following:

• two CentOS, Red Hat Enterprise Linux or Scientific Linux 5 servers or VM's
• some patience

Here's how I plan to name my servers:

• kdc.example.com — the Kerberos KDC server at 192.168.250.2
• client.example.com — the Kerberos client at 192.168.250.3

CRITICAL STEP: Before getting started, ensure that both systems have their hostnames properly set and both systems have the hostnames and IP addresses of both systems in /etc/hosts. Your server and client must be able to know the IP and hostname of the other system as well as themselves.

First off, we will need NIS working to serve up the user information for our client. Install the NIS server components on the KDC server:

[root@kdc ~]# yum install ypserv

Set the NIS domain and set a static port for ypserv to make it easier to firewall off. Edit /etc/sysconfig/network on the KDC server:

NISDOMAINNAME=EXAMPLE.COM
YPSERV_ARGS="-p 808"

Manually set the NIS domain on the KDC server and add it to /etc/yp.conf:

[root@kdc ~]# nisdomain EXAMPLE.COM
[root@kdc ~]# echo "domain EXAMPLE.COM server kdc.example.com" >> /etc/yp.conf

Adjust /var/yp/securenets on the KDC server for additional security:

[root@kdc ~]# echo "255.0.0.0 127.0.0.0" >> /var/yp/securenets
[root@kdc ~]# echo "255.255.255.0 192.168.250.0" >> /var/yp/securenets

Start the NIS server and generate the NIS maps:

[root@kdc ~]# /etc/init.d/ypserv start; chkconfig ypserv on
[root@kdc ~]# make -C /var/yp

I usually like to prepare my iptables rules ahead of time so I ensure that it doesn't derail me later on. Paste this into the KDC's terminal:

iptables -N SERVICES
iptables -I INPUT -j SERVICES
iptables -A SERVICES -p tcp --dport 111 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "rpc"
iptables -A SERVICES -p udp --dport 111 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "rpc"
iptables -A SERVICES -p tcp --dport 808 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "nis"
iptables -A SERVICES -p udp --dport 808 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "nis"
iptables -A SERVICES -p tcp --dport 88 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "kerberos"
iptables -A SERVICES -p udp --dport 88 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "kerberos"
iptables -A SERVICES -p udp --dport 464 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "kerberos"
iptables -A SERVICES -p tcp --dport 749 -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "kerberos"
/etc/init.d/iptables save

We need our time in sync for Kerberos to work properly. Install NTP on both nodes, start it, and ensure it comes up at boot time:

[root@kdc ~]# yum -y install ntp && chkconfig ntpd on && /etc/init.d/ntpd start
[root@client ~]# yum -y install ntp && chkconfig ntpd on && /etc/init.d/ntpd start

Now we're ready to set up Kerberos. Start by installing some packages on the KDC:

[root@kdc ~]# yum install krb5-server krb5-workstation

We will need to make some edits to /etc/krb5.conf on the KDC to set up our KDC realm. Ensure that the default_realm is set:

default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM

The [realms] section should look like this:

[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
	kdc = 192.168.250.2:88
	admin_server = 192.168.250.2:749
}

The [domain_realm] section should look like this:

[domain_realm]
kdc.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
client.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM

Add validate = true within the pam { } block of the [appdefaults] section:

[appdefaults]
 pam = {
   validate = true

Adjust /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf on the KDC:

[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
	master_key_type = des-hmac-sha1
	default_principal_flags = +preauth
}

There's one last configuration file to edit on the KDC! Ensure that /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl looks like this:

*/admin@EXAMPLE.COM	    *

We're now ready to make a KDC database to hold our sensitive Kerberos data. Create the database and set a good password which you can remember. This command also stashes your password on the KDC so you don't have to enter it each time you start the KDC:

kdb5_util create -r EXAMPLE.COM -s

On the KDC, create a principal for the admin user as well as user1 (which we'll create shortly). Also, export the admin details to the kadmind key tab. You'll get some extra output after each one of these commands but I've snipped it to reduce the length of the post.

[root@kdc ~]# kadmin.local
kadmin.local:  addprinc root/admin
kadmin.local:  addprinc user1
kadmin.local:  ktadd -k /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab kadmin/admin
kadmin.local:  ktadd -k /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab kadmin/changepw
kadmin.local:  exit

Let's start the Kerberos KDC and kadmin daemons:

[root@kdc ~]# /etc/init.d/krb5kdc start; /etc/init.d/kadmin start
[root@kdc ~]# chkconfig krb5kdc on; chkconfig kadmin on

Now that the administration work is done, let's create a principal for our KDC server and stick it in it's keytab:

[root@kdc ~]# kadmin.local
kadmin.local:  addprinc -randkey host/kdc.example.com
kadmin.local:  ktadd host/kdc.example.com

Transfer your /etc/krb5.conf from the KDC server to the client. Hop onto the client server, install the Kerberos client package and add some host principals:

[root@client ~]# yum install krb5-workstation
[root@client ~]# kadmin.local
kadmin.local:  addpinc --randkey host/client.example.com
kadmin.local:  ktadd host/kdc.example.com

There aren't any daemons on the client side, so the configuration is pretty much wrapped up there for Kerberos. However, we now need to tell both servers to use Kerberos for auth and your client servers needs to use NIS to get user data.

• On the KDC:
  • run authconfig-tui
  • choose Use Kerberos from the second column
  • press Next
  • don't edit the configuration (authconfig got the data from /etc/krb.conf)
  • press OK
• On the client:
  • run authconfig-tui
  • choose Use NIS and Use Kerberos
  • press Next
  • enter your NIS domain (EXAMPLE.COM) and NIS server (kdc.example.com or 192.168.250.2)
  • press Next
  • don't edit the Kerberos configuration (authconfig got the data from /etc/krb.conf)
  • press OK

Got NIS problems? If the NIS connection stalls on the client, ensure that you have the iptables rules present on the KDC that we added near the beginning of this guide. Also, if you forgot to add both hosts to both servers' /etc/hosts, go do that now.

Let's make our test user on the KDC. Don't add this user to the client — we'll get the user information via NIS and authenticate via Kerberos shortly. We'll also rebuild our NIS maps after adding the user:

[root@kdc ~]# useradd user1
[root@kdc ~]# passwd user1
[root@kdc ~]# make -C /var/yp/

On the client, see if you can get the password hash for the user1 account via NIS:

[root@client ~]# ypcat -d EXAMPLE.COM -h kdc.example.com passwd | grep user1
user1:$1$sUlSTlCv$riK5El3z8N4y.mi5Fe3Q60:500:500::/home/user1:/bin/bash

You can see why NIS isn't a good way to authenticate users. Someone could easily pull the hash for any account and brute force the hash on their own server. Go back to the KDC and lock out the user account:

[root@kdc ~]# usermod -p '!!' user1

Go back to the client and try to pull the password hash now:

[root@client ~]# ypcat -d EXAMPLE.COM -h kdc.example.com passwd | grep user1
user1:!!:500:500::/home/user1:/bin/bash

On the plus side, the user's password hash is now gone. On the negative side, you've just prevented this user from logging in locally or via NIS. Don't worry, the user can log in via Kerberos now. Let's prepare a home directory on the client for the user:

[root@client ~]# mkdir /home/user1
[root@client ~]# cp -av /etc/skel/.bash* /home/user1/
[root@client ~]# chown -R user1:user1 /home/user1/

Note: In a real-world scenario, you'd probably want to export this user's home directory via NFS so they didn't get a different home directory on every server.

While you're still on the client, try to log into the client via the user. Use the password that you used when you created the user1 principal on the KDC.

[root@client ~]# ssh user1@localhost
user1@localhost's password:
[user1@client ~]$ whoami
user1

List your Kerberos tickets and you should see one for your user principal:

[user1@client ~]$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_500_fCKPnZ
Default principal: user1@EXAMPLE.COM
 
Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
02/05/12 14:18:53  02/06/12 00:18:53  krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
	renew until 02/05/12 14:18:53

Your KDC should have a couple of lines in its /var/log/krb5kdc.log showing the authentication:

Feb 05 14:18:53 kdc.example.com krb5kdc[4694](info): AS_REQ (12 etypes {18 17 16 23 1 3 2 11 10 15 12 13}) 192.168.250.3: ISSUE: authtime 1328473133, etypes {rep=16 tkt=16 ses=16}, user1@EXAMPLE.COM for krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
Feb 05 14:18:53 kdc.example.com krb5kdc[4694](info): TGS_REQ (7 etypes {18 17 16 23 1 3 2}) 192.168.250.3: ISSUE: authtime 1328473133, etypes {rep=16 tkt=18 ses=18}, user1@EXAMPLE.COM for host/client.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM

The first line shows that the client asked for a Authentication Server Request (AS_REQ) and the second line shows that the client then asked for a Ticket Granting Server Request (TGS_REQ). In layman's terms, the client first asked for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) so it could authenticate to other services. When it actually tried to log in via ssh it asked for a ticket (and received it).

YOU JUST CONFIGURED KERBEROS!

From here, the sky's the limit. Another popular implementation of Kerberos is encrypted NFSv4. You can even go crazy and use Kerberos with apache.

Let me know if you have any questions about this post or if you spot any errors. With this many steps, there's bound to be a typo or two in this guide. Keep in mind that there are some obvious spots for network-level and service-level security improvements. This guide was intended to give you the basics and it doesn't cover all of the security implications involved with a Kerberos implementation.

The Kerberos-hater's guide to installing Kerberos is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

Scientific Linux installations have a package called yum-autoupdate by default and the package contains two files:

# rpm -ql yum-autoupdate
/etc/cron.daily/yum-autoupdate
/etc/sysconfig/yum-autoupdate

The cron job contains the entire script to run automatic updates once a day and the configuration file controls its behavior. However, you can't get the same functionality as Fedora's yum-updatesd package where you can receive notifications for updates rather than automatically updating the packages.

To get those notifications in Scientific Linux, just make two small edits to this portion of /etc/cron.daily/yum-autoupdate:

173           echo "    Starting Yum with command"
174           echo "     /usr/bin/yum -c $TEMPCONFIGFILE -e 0 -d 1 -y update"
175   fi
176   /usr/bin/yum -c $TEMPCONFIGFILE -e 0 -d 1 -y update > $TEMPFILE 2>&1
177   if [ -s $TEMPFILE ] ; then

Adjust the update commands to look like this:

173           echo "    Starting Yum with command"
174           echo "     /usr/bin/yum -c $TEMPCONFIGFILE -e 0 -d 1 -y check-update"
175   fi
176   /usr/bin/yum -c $TEMPCONFIGFILE -e 0 -d 1 -y check-update > $TEMPFILE 2>&1
177   if [ -s $TEMPFILE ] ; then

Since you won't be auto-updating with this script any longer, you may want to comment out the EXCLUDE= line in /etc/sysconfig/yum-autoupdate so that you'll receive notifications for all packages with updates. Also, to avoid having your changes updated with a newer yum-autoupdate package later, add the package to your list of excluded packages in /etc/yum.conf.

Get notifications instead of automatic updates in Scientific Linux is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

I'll be the first one to admit that Kerberos drives me a little insane. It's a requirement for two of the exams in Red Hat's RHCA certification track and I've been forced to learn it. It provides some pretty nice security features for large server environments. You get central single sign ons, encrypted authentication, and bidirectional validation. However, getting it configured can be a real pain due to some rather archaic commands and shells.

Here's Kerberos in a nutshell within a two-server environment: One server is a Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) and the other is a Kerberos client. The KDC has the list of users and their passwords. Consider a situation where a user tries to ssh into the Kerberos client:

• sshd calls to pam to authenticate the user
• pam calls to the KDC for a ticket granting ticket (TGT) to see if the user can authenticate
• the KDC replies to the client with a TGT encrypted with the user's password
• pam (on the client) tries to decrypt the TGT with the password that the user provided via ssh
• if pam can decrypt the TGT, it knows the user is providing the right password

Now that the client has a a TGT for that user, it can ask for tickets to access other network services. What if the user who just logged in wants to access another Kerberized service in the environment?

• client calls the KDC and asks for a ticket to grant access to the other service
• KDC replies with two copies of the ticket:
  • one copy is encrypted with the user's current TGT
  • a second copy is encrypted with the password of the network service the user wants to access
• the client can decrypt the ticket which was encrypted with the current TGT since it has the TGT already
• client makes an authenticator by taking the decrypted ticket and encrypting it with a timestamp
• client passes the authenticator and the second copy of the ticket it received from the KDC
• the other network service decrypts the second copy of the ticket and verifies the password
• the other network service uses the decrypted ticket to decrypt the authenticator it received from the client
• if the timestamp looks good, the other network service allows the user access

Okay, that's confusing. Let's take it one step further. Enabling pre-authentication requires that clients send a request containing a timestamp encrypted with the user's password prior to asking for a TGT. Without this requirement, an attacker can ask for a TGT one time and then brute force the TGT offline. Pre-authentication forces the client to send a timestamped request encrypted with the user's password back to the KDC before they can ask for a TGT. This means the attacker is forced to try different passwords when encrypting the timestamp in the hopes that they'll get a TGT to work with eventually. One would hope that you have something configured on the KDC to set off an alarm for multiple failed pre-authentication attempts.

Oh, but we can totally kick it up another notch. What if an attacker is able to give a bad password to a client but they're also able to impersonate the KDC? They could reply to the TGT request (as the KDC) with a TGT encrypted with whichever password they choose and get access to the client system. Enabling mutual authentication stops this attack since it forces the client to ask the KDC for the client's own host principal password (this password is set when the client is configured to talk to the KDC). The attacker shouldn't have any clue what that password is and the attack will be thwarted.

By this point, you're either saying «Oh man, I don't ever want to do this.» or «How do I set up Kerberos?». Stay tuned if you're in the second group. I'll have a dead simple (or as close to dead simple as one can get with Kerberos) how-to on the blog shortly.

In the meantime, here are a few links for extra Kerberos bedtime reading:

• Kerberos on Wikipedia
• MIT's «Why Kerberos» [PDF]
• How Kerberos Authentication Works

Kerberos for haters is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

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I used to be one of those folks who would install Fedora, CentOS, Scientific Linux, or Red Hat and disable SELinux during the installation. It always seemed like SELinux would get in my way and keep me from getting work done.

Later on, I found that one of my servers (which I'd previously secured quite thoroughly) had some rogue processes running that were spawned through httpd. Had I actually been using SELinux in enforcing mode, those processes would have probably never even started.

If you're trying to get started with SELinux but you're not sure how to do it without completely disrupting your server's workflow, these tips should help:

Get some good reporting and monitoring
Two of the most handy SELinux tools are setroubleshoot and setroubleshoot-server. If you're running a server without X, you can use my guide for configuring setroubleshoot-server. You will receive email alerts within seconds of an AVC denial and the emails should contain tips on how to resolve the denial if the original action should be allowed. If the AVC denial caught something you didn't expect, you'll know about the potential security breach almost immediately.

Start out with SELinux in permissive mode
If you're overly concerned about SELinux getting in your way, or if you're enabling SELinux on a server that has been running without SELinux since it was installed, start out with SELinux in permissive mode. To make the change effective immediately, just run:

# setenforce 0
# getenforce
Permissive

Edit /etc/sysconfig/selinux to make it persistent across reboots:

# This file controls the state of SELinux on the system.
# SELINUX= can take one of these three values:
#     enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced.
#     permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing.
#     disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded.
SELINUX=permissive

Adjust booleans before adding your own custom modules
There are a lot of booleans you can toggle to get the functionality you need without adding your own custom SELinux modules with audit2allow. If you wanted to see all of the applicable booleans for httpd, just use getsebool:

# getsebool -a | grep httpd
httpd_builtin_scripting --> on
httpd_can_check_spam --> off
httpd_can_network_connect --> on
httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler --> off
httpd_can_network_connect_db --> off
httpd_can_network_memcache --> off
httpd_can_network_relay --> on
httpd_can_sendmail --> on
... and so on ...

Toggling booleans is easy with togglesebool:

# togglesebool httpd_can_network_memcache
httpd_can_network_memcache: active

Now httpd can talk to memcache. You can also use setsebool if you want to be specific about your setting (this is good for scripts):

# setsebool httpd_can_network_memcache on

Tracking your history of AVC denials
All of your AVC denals are logged by auditd in /var/log/audit/audit.log but it's not the easiest file to read and parse. That's where aureport comes in:

# aureport --avc | tail -n 5
45. 01/24/2012 04:23:29 postdrop unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 4 fifo_file getattr system_u:object_r:postfix_public_t:s0 denied 1061
46. 01/24/2012 04:23:29 postdrop unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 2 fifo_file write system_u:object_r:postfix_public_t:s0 denied 1062
47. 01/24/2012 04:23:29 postdrop unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 2 fifo_file open system_u:object_r:postfix_public_t:s0 denied 1062
48. 01/24/2012 14:01:58 sendmail unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 160 process setrlimit unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 denied 1123
49. 01/24/2012 14:01:58 postdrop unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 4 dir search system_u:object_r:postfix_public_t:s0 denied 1124

Summary
There's no need to be scared of or be annoyed by SELinux in your server environment. While it takes some getting used to (and what new software doesn't?), you'll have an extra layer of security and access restrictions which should let you sleep a little better at night.

Getting started with SELinux is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

If you want to forward e-mail from root to another user, you can usually place a .forward file in root's home directory and your mail server will take care of the rest:

echo "user@example.com" > /root/.forward

With SELinux, you'll end up getting an AVC denial each time your mail server tries to read the contents of the .forward file:

type=AVC msg=audit(1325543823.787:7416): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=9850
  comm="local" name=".forward" dev=md0 ino=17694734
  scontext=system_u:system_r:postfix_local_t:s0
  tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 tclass=file

The reason is that your .forward file doesn't have the right SELinux contexts. You can set the correct contest quickly with restorecon:

# ls -Z /root/.forward
-rw-r--r--. root root unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 /root/.forward
# restorecon -v /root/.forward
restorecon reset /root/.forward context unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0->system_u:object_r:mail_forward_t:s0
# ls -Z /root/.forward
-rw-r--r--. root root system_u:object_r:mail_home_t:s0 /root/.forward

Try to send another e-mail to root and you should see the mail server forward the e-mail properly without any additional AVC denials.

SELinux and .forward files is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

When you install Scientific Linux, it will keep you on the same point release that you installed. For example, if you install it from a 6.0 DVD, you'll stay on 6.0 and get security releases for that point release only.

Getting it to behave like Red Hat Enterprise Linux and CentOS is a painless process. Just install the sl6x repository with yum:

yum install yum-conf-sl6x

Check to ensure that you're getting updates from the new repository:

# yum repolist
repo id            repo name                                              status
sl                 Scientific Linux 6.1 - x86_64                          6,251
sl-security        Scientific Linux 6.1 - x86_64 - security updates         548
sl6x               Scientific Linux 6x - x86_64                           6,251
sl6x-security      Scientific Linux 6x - x86_64 - security updates          548
repolist: 13,598

Automatically upgrading to new point releases of Scientific Linux is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

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SELinux isn't a technology that's easy to tackle for newcomers. However, there's been a lot of work to smooth out the rough edges while still keeping a tight grip on what applications and users are allowed to do on a Linux system. One of the biggest efforts has been around setroubleshoot.

The purpose behind setroubleshoot is to let users know when access has been denied, help them resolve it if necessary, and to reduce overall frustration while working through tight security restrictions in the default SELinux policies. The GUI frontend for setroubleshoot is great for users who run Linux desktops or those who run servers with a display attached. Don't worry, you can configure setroubleshoot on remote servers to send alerts elsewhere when a GUI alert isn't an option.

Install a few packages to get started:

yum install setroubleshoot{-server,-plugins,-doc}

Open /etc/setroubleshoot/setroubleshoot.conf in your favorite text editor and adjust the [email] section to fit your server:

recipients_filepath = /var/lib/setroubleshoot/email_alert_recipients
smtp_port = 25
smtp_host = localhost
from_address = selinux@myserver.com
subject = [MyServer] SELinux AVC Alert

You could probably see it coming, but you need to put the e-mail addresses for your recipients into /var/lib/setroubleshoot/email_alert_recipients:

echo "selinux@mycompany.com" >> /var/lib/setroubleshoot/email_alert_recipients

You'll notice that setroubleshoot doesn't have an init script and it doesn't exist in systemd in Fedora 15. It runs through the dbus-daemon and a quick bounce of the messagebus via its init script brings in the necessary components to run setroubleshoot:

service messagebus restart

A really easy (and safe) test is to ask sshd to bind to a non-standard port. Simply define an additional port on in your /etc/ssh/sshd_config like this:

Port 22
Port 222

When you restart sshd, it will bind to port 22 with success, but it won't be allowed to bind to port 222 (since that's blocked by SELinux as a non-standard port for the ssh_port_t port type). DON'T WORRY! Your sshd server will still be listening on port 22. If you wait a moment, you'll get an e-mail (perhaps two) that not only notify you of the denial, but they make suggestions for how to fix it:

SELinux is preventing /usr/sbin/sshd from name_bind access on the tcp_socket port 222.
 
*****  Plugin bind_ports (99.5 confidence) suggests  *************************
 
If you want to allow /usr/sbin/sshd to bind to network port 222
Then you need to modify the port type.
Do
# semanage port -a -t PORT_TYPE -p tcp 222
   where PORT_TYPE is one of the following: ...

For this particular example, the quick fix would be to run:

semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 222

Much of this post's information was gathered from the detailed documentation on Fedora's setroubleshoot User's FAQ as well as Dan Walsh's setroubleshoot blog post.

Receive e-mail reports for SELinux AVC denials is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.

I'm using SELinux more often now on my Fedora 15 installations and I came up against a peculiar issue today on a new server. My PHP installation is configured to store its sessions in memcached and I brought over some working configurations from another server. However, each time I accessed a page which tried to initiate a session, the page load would hang for about a minute and I'd find this in my apache error logs:

[Thu Sep 08 03:23:40 2011] [error] [client 11.22.33.44] PHP Warning:
Unknown: Failed to write session data (memcached). Please verify that
the current setting of session.save_path is correct (127.0.0.1:11211)
in Unknown on line 0

I ran through my usual list of checks:

• netstat showed memcached bound to the correct ports/interfaces
• memcached was running and I could reach it via telnet
• memcached-tool could connect and pull stats from memcached
• double-checked my php.ini
• tested memcached connectivity via a PHP and ruby script — they worked

Even after all that, I still couldn't figure out what was wrong. I ran strace on memcached while I ran a curl against the page which creates a session and I found something significant — memcached wasn't seeing any connections whatsoever at that time. A quick check of the lo interface with tcpdump showed the same result. Just before I threw a chair, I remembered one thing:

SELinux.

A quick check for AVC denials showed the problem:

# aureport --avc | tail -n 1
4021. 09/08/2011 03:23:38 httpd system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 42 tcp_socket name_connect system_u:object_r:memcache_port_t:s0 denied 31536

I'm far from being a guru on SELinux, so I leaned on audit2allow for help:

# grep memcache /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow
 
#============= httpd_t ==============
#!!!! This avc can be allowed using one of the these booleans:
#     httpd_can_network_relay, httpd_can_network_memcache, httpd_can_network_connect
 
allow httpd_t memcache_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;

The boolean we're looking for is httpd_can_network_memcache. Flipping the boolean can be done in a snap:

# setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1
# getsebool httpd_can_network_memcache
httpd_can_network_memcache --> on

After adjusting the boolean, apache was able to make connections to memcached without a hitch. My page which created sessions loaded quickly and I could see data being stored in memcached. If you want to check the status of all of the apache-related SELinux booleans, just use getsebool:

# getsebool -a | grep httpd | grep off$
allow_httpd_anon_write --> off
allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind --> off
allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam --> off
allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write --> off
httpd_can_check_spam --> off
httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler --> off
httpd_can_network_connect_db --> off
httpd_can_network_relay --> off
httpd_can_sendmail --> off
httpd_dbus_avahi --> off
httpd_enable_ftp_server --> off
httpd_enable_homedirs --> off
httpd_execmem --> off
httpd_read_user_content --> off
httpd_setrlimit --> off
httpd_ssi_exec --> off
httpd_tmp_exec --> off
httpd_unified --> off
httpd_use_cifs --> off
httpd_use_gpg --> off
httpd_use_nfs --> off

If you're interested in SELinux, a good way to get your feet wet is to head over to the CentOS Wiki and review their SELinux Howtos

Getting apache, PHP, and memcached working with SELinux is a post from: Major Hayden's Racker Hacker blog.

Thanks for following the blog via the RSS feed. Please don't copy my posts or quote portions of them without attribution.